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I.

INTRODUCTION
When a federal court grants an abstention-based dismissal in a diversity case, the court

abdicates its strict duty to exercise its jurisdiction where that jurisdiction has been properly
invoked. Thus, a federal court may not dismiss a case on abstention grounds unless it concludes
that "exceptional circumstances" require the dismissal. When a federal court grants an
abstention-based stay in a diversity case, however, the court does not violate its jurisdictional
duty. According to the Supreme Court, an abstention-based stay is merely a postponement of the
exercise of jurisdiction. Although the Court has characterized an abstention-based stay as a
delay rather than an abdication of the jurisdictional exercise, the Court surprisingly has not
approved the liberal use of such stays. Instead, the Court has limited abstention-based stays, like
abstention-based dismissals, to exceptional circumstances.
In the certification context, unlike the abstention context, the Court has never addressed
the question whether a federal court violates its duty to exercise it jurisdiction when it grants a
certification-based stay in a diversity case. Several scholars have argued, however, that indeed
certification in diversity cases constitutes an abdication of the jurisdictional duty.1 Likewise,
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See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State
Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1676, 1729-40 (2003) (arguing that "certification is inconsistent with the statutory
diversity jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Congress to the extent that it improperly allows state
courts to hear cases that fall within the statutory grant"); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use
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many of the federal circuit courts believe that a federal court surrenders its jurisdiction when it
certifies an unsettled question of state law in a diversity case.2 Accordingly, these circuits
restrict certification, like abstention, to exceptional circumstances.3
This Article argues that a federal court does not abdicate its duty to exercise its
jurisdiction when it certifies in a diversity case; instead, the court merely postpones the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Thus, federal courts need not limit certification in diversity cases to
exceptional circumstances. To substantiate this argument, Part II of this article explains the
pertinent abstention doctrines and the extension of abstention principles from suits for equitable
relief to suits for damages. Part II also explains the development of the Supreme Court's
distinction between abstention-based dismissals and abstention-based stays. Part III briefly
describes certification, discusses the Supreme Court's certification case law, and establishes that
the Court itself has distinguished certification from abstention. Part IV then reviews the federal
circuits' certification case law. This survey shows that several circuits, without explanation,
equate certification with abstention and therefore require exceptional circumstances before they
will certify.
Part V synthesizes Parts II-IV and demonstrates that certification is distinguishable from
abstention. Specifically, Part V contends that, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion,
abstention-based stays in diversity cases result in the relinquishment of jurisdiction because they
entail a full round of litigation in a state court system and therefore require all or an essential part
of the suit to be litigated in a state forum. Consequently, abstention-based stays are the
of Certification, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305, 312 (1994) (arguing that certification results in "frustration of the
constitutional grant of diversity and supplemental jurisdiction to the federal courts"); Brian Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 717, 729-31
(1969) (arguing that certification constitutes "an abdication of the responsibility imposed by Congress to adjudicate
cases when federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked").
2
See infra Part IV.A.
3
See infra Part IV.A.

2

functional equivalent of abstention-based dismissals. In contrast, certification-based stays in
diversity cases actually result in postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction because
certification is simply a device that assists courts in the adjudicatory process. Certification
allows a federal court, in effect, to research a question of state law and does not require factfinding or application of law to facts. Thus, because certification does not involve the abdication
of duty, it is distinguishable from abstention. Federal courts therefore should not employ
abstention principles to restrict the use of certification.
Part VI briefly addresses several secondary factors that federal courts sitting in diversity
consider in deciding whether to certify. This Part concludes that at least some of these factors
are highly relevant to the certification decision, and so it is these aspects of certification – not the
exceptional circumstances requirement of abstention – to which the courts should turn their
focus.
II.

ABSTENTION
When Congress enacted the jurisdictional statutes,4 it conferred upon the federal courts a

"strict duty" to adjudicate controversies where their jurisdiction is properly invoked.5 This
"duty" derives from the "undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary,
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See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ("The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between – (1) citizens of different States . . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
("Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.").
5
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 715 (1996); see also Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (stating that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . .
. to exercise the jurisdiction given them"); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)
(referring to the "duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it"); Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234
("The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its
purpose was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the
federal rather than in the state courts."); Cohens v. State of Va., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").
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defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds."6
Nevertheless, the federal courts' obligation to decide cases is not "absolute."7 The Supreme
Court has long held that federal courts have the power to abstain.8 When a federal court
abstains, it either (1) declines to exercise its jurisdiction altogether by remanding a removed case
to state court or dismissing the case outright,9 or (2) "postpones" the exercise of its jurisdiction
by staying the federal proceedings and remitting the parties to a state trial court to start a new
lawsuit in order to resolve an unsettled question of state law.10 Given the courts' rigorous duty,
however, the power to abstain is limited to "'exceptional circumstances where the order to the
parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.'"11
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New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
7
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716.
8
See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814-17 (discussing the different categories of abstention and citing
many cases in which the Supreme Court has approved of abstention). There is a longstanding debate in the
abstention literature as to whether the Supreme Court has validly held that federal courts have the power to abstain.
Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J.
71 (1984) (arguing that abstention violates separation of powers principles), with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985) (arguing that abstention "does not endanger, but rather protects, the
principle of separation of powers" and "that the responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and
should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal
jurisdiction"). See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (arguing that "the boundaries of federal jurisdiction – and the authority to
define that jurisdiction – evolve through a dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial response);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Honoring David Shapiro, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1891 (2004) (discussing the themes set forth in
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985)). This article does not purport to
enter this particular debate. Instead, this article assumes, based on Supreme Court precedent, that federal courts
have the authority to abstain in certain circumstances.
9
See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a
complaint on abstention grounds); see also Meredith, 320 U.S. at 235 (citing numerous examples of abstentionbased dismissals).
10
See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959) (affirming a district
court's stay of proceedings on abstention grounds); see also id. at 27 (discussing abstention-based stays). See also
Gerald M. Levin, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism,
111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 344, 346 (1963) ("When a federal court abstains, the litigants bring a separate action, often for
declaratory judgment, in the appropriate state court . . . . Since the ultimate purpose of abstention is to secure an
authoritative determination of state law, the litigants must then proceed to the final appellate court through the
required tiers of the state judiciary.").
11
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89); see also Quackenbush,
517 U.S. at 715 ("[F]ederal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise ‘exceptional
circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.") (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89 ("The doctrine of abstention, under
which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and
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A.

ABSTENTION AND SUITS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF

The Court has "located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal
courts 'sitting in equity'" to decline to exercise their jurisdiction.12 Thus, it is not surprising that
the Court initially applied abstention principles to suits for equitable relief. In these cases, the
Court balanced the federal duty to decide cases against the state interests involved. The Court
approved of abstention only where it found that principles of federal-state comity dictated that all
or part of the dispute should be resolved in a state court.
For example, in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,13 the Court ruled that the
district court should have abstained in a federal constitutional case involving the interpretation of
an ambiguous state statute.14 In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered that all
sleeping cars on trains must be operated by Pullman conductors.15 At that time, all of the
conductors were white.16 The Pullman Company and the affected railroads sued in federal court
to enjoin the Commission's order.17 The Pullman porters, who were all black, intervened in the
suit as plaintiffs.18 The plaintiffs argued that the Commission's order violated a Texas statute
and the United States Constitution.19
The Supreme Court found that under Texas law, it was unclear whether the state statute at
issue authorized the Commission's order.20 Instead of interpreting Texas law itself, the Court

narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.").
12
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718; see also id. at 717 ("[I]t has long been established that a federal court
has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of
equity.’ This tradition . . . explains the development of our abstention doctrines.") (internal citations omitted).
13
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
14
See generally id.
15
Id. at 497-98.
16
Id. at 497.
17
Id. at 498.
18
Id. at 497-98.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 497, 499.
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remanded the case to the district court with instructions to stay the federal proceedings and remit
the parties to state court to obtain an authoritative interpretation of Texas law from the Texas
courts.21 The Court based its decision on "important considerations of policy in the
administration of federal equity jurisdiction."22 The Court reasoned that if the state courts found
that the Commission violated state law by issuing its order, the litigation would end.23 Thus, by
sending the parties to state court, the federal court would have avoided adjudicating a
"substantial constitutional issue" that "touch[ed] a sensitive area of social policy" or issuing an
injunction against the order of a state agency.24 On the other hand, if the state court found that
the Commission's order violated state law, the parties could return to federal court for
adjudication of the constitutional issues.25 The district court would no longer be faced with
issuing a "premature constitutional" ruling based on unclear state law, but instead could issue a
decision that would not later be mooted by a state court's interpretation of the statute.26
According to the Court, abstention under the circumstances in Pullman demonstrated
"'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary."27 Thus, the court's use of its equitable discretion to stay the
federal constitutional litigation and obtain clarification of state law "further[ed] the harmonious
relation between state and federal authority."28

21

See id. at 501-02.
Id. at 501.
23
See id. at 498, 501-02.
24
See id. at 498, 500-02.
25
See id. at 501.
26
See id. at 499-500 ("The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that
will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.").
27
See id. at 501.
28
Id.
22
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Similarly, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,29 a case decided two years after Pullman, the
Supreme Court upheld a district court's decision to abstain based on considerations of federalstate comity. In Burford, the Texas Railroad Commission issued a permit to G.E. Burford to drill
four oil wells.30 Sun Oil Company and The Magnolia Petroleum Company then sued the
Railroad Commission, Burford and another oil company in federal district court, seeking
cancellation of the permit or, in the alternative, an injunction to prevent operation of the wells.31
The "principal issue" was whether the Commission's order was reasonable.32 Texas had
developed a "complex administrative system"33 to address such claims, and thus had
"demonstrated [an] interest in maintaining uniform review of the Commission's orders."34
Nevertheless, "the federal courts had, in the years preceding Burford, become increasingly
involved in reviewing the reasonableness of the Commission's orders."35
The district court held that the suit should be brought in a state forum and dismissed the
case.36 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had properly declined to
exercise its jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.37 The Court
identified a number of "unique" grounds that favored dismissal38 and reasoned that dismissal
"was appropriate because the availability of an alternative, federal forum threatened to frustrate
the purpose of the complex administrative system that Texas had established" to adjudicate the
29

319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941), vacated, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1942), rev’d en
banc, 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
31
Id.
32
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 723 (1996) (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 317).
33
See id. (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332).
34
Id. at 724.
35
Id. at (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 326, 327).
36
Sun Oil Co., 124 F.2d at 468.
37
Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
38
In Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 725, a case decided fifty-three years after Burford, the Court explained that
it "approved the District Court's dismissal of the complaint [in Burford] on a number of grounds that were unique to
that case," including (1) "the difficulty of the regulatory issues presented," (2) "the demonstrated need for uniform
regulation in the area," and (3) "[m]ost importantly, . . . the detrimental impact of ongoing federal court review of
the Commission's orders, which . . . had already led to contradictory adjudications by the state and federal courts."
30
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type of claims at issue in Burford.39 Thus, as in Pullman, the Court found that "a sound respect
for the independence of state action require[d] the federal equity court to stay its hand."40
In contrast to its decisions in Pullman and Burford, in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven41
the Supreme Court held that an appellate court improperly exercised its discretion to abstain.
The plaintiffs in Meredith owned bonds that had been issued and were redeemable by the City of
Winter Haven, Florida.42 They brought suit in federal district court, seeking both declaratory and
injunctive relief, to prevent the City from redeeming the bonds without paying interest.43 The
court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, and the only issues in the case involved
the proper interpretation of Florida law.44
The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action under
Florida law and dismissed the complaint.45 The court of appeals concluded that the applicable
Florida constitutional and statutory law was uncertain and therefore ordered that the case be
dismissed without prejudice so that the plaintiffs could proceed in state court.46 The Supreme
Court framed the question before it as whether the appellate court "rightly declined to exercise its

39

Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 725 (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332). In Burford, the plaintiffs invoked
federal jurisdiction on both diversity and federal question grounds. 319 U.S. at 317. In addition to their state law
claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the Commission's order violated the U.S. Constitution. Id. Thus, the dismissal in
Burford "had the effect of avoiding a federal constitutional issue." Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 815 n.21. Nevertheless,
the presence of the federal question in Burford, "was not an additional ground for abstention." Id.
40
Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
41
320 U.S. 228 (1943).
42
Id. at 229-30.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 230.
46
Id.
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jurisdiction" because the case turned on unclear Florida law.47 The Court concluded that the
dismissal was improper, reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and remanded the case.48
The Meredith Court opined that, given the federal courts' strict duty to exercise their
jurisdiction, they cannot decline to do so "merely because the answers to the questions of state
law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the state."49
Thus, the Meredith Court held that unlike the prior cases in which it had approved abstention,
there were no exceptional circumstances present in the case at bar that justified an abstentionbased dismissal.50 In contrast to Pullman and Burford, Meredith did not involve a federal
constitutional question that could be mooted by remitting the parties to state court51 or
"interference with [state] agencies or with the state courts."52 It simply involved uncertain
Florida law regarding the extent of the City's liability on the bonds.
Moreover, the Meredith Court emphasized that the purpose of the diversity statute is to
give litigants "an opportunity. . . to assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state
courts."53 The Court explained that to deny the plaintiffs this option absent exceptional
circumstances "would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act,"54 further delay the litigation,55
and penalize the plaintiffs without justification for invoking diversity jurisdiction.56 Finally, the

47

Id. at 229.
Id. at 238.
49
Id. at 234.
50
Id. at 236.
51
Id. at 236 (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. 496).
52
Id. at 237.
53
Id. at 234.
54
Id. at 234-35; see also id. at 237 ("We are pointed to no public policy or interest which would be served
by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which Congress has created with the purpose that it
should be availed of and exercised subject only to such limitations as traditionally justify courts in declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which they possess.").
55
Id. at 237.
56
Id. ("To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which has
been pending for more than two years and which is now ready for decision. It is to penalize [plaintiffs] for resorting
to a jurisdiction which they were entitled to invoke, in the absence of any special circumstances which would
48
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Court recognized that while only Florida's highest court could "settle" the state law questions
involved, the federal courts could at least "adjudicate the rights of the parties" before them.57
B.

ABSTENTION AND SUITS FOR DAMAGES

Although the Court first applied abstention principles to suits for equitable relief, the
court has not limited abstention to such suits.58 Instead, the Court has permitted federal courts to
abstain from exercising their jurisdiction whenever they have discretion to grant or deny relief.59
Abstention principles consequently apply not only in suits for injunctive relief, but also in
declaratory judgment actions.60 Moreover, the Court has further extended abstention principles
to common law suits for damages.61
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,62 for example, the City of Thibodaux,
Louisiana filed a petition in Louisiana state court "asserting a taking of the [Power and Light
Company's] land, buildings, and equipment."63 The defendant removed the case to federal
district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship64 and sought compensation for the taking.65
A Louisiana statute appeared to permit the taking, but the statute had never been interpreted by
warrant a refusal to exercise it."); see also County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 196-97 ("To order [the plaintiffs] out of
the federal court [absent exceptional circumstances] would accomplish nothing except to require still another
lawsuit, with added delay and expense for all parties. . . . It exacts a severe penalty from citizens for their attempt to
exercise rights of access to the federal courts granted them by Congress to deny them 'that promptness of decision
which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice.'").
57
See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 238.
58
See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See id. This Article uses the phrases "damages action, "suit for damages," and "suits at law" (as well as
other variations of these phrases) interchangeably to refer to suits seeking monetary relief as opposed to equitable
relief. See Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1871, 1873 n. 10 (1999)
("One common way of distinguishing equitable actions from actions at law is that, in the former, the court has
discretion to adapt its relief to the circumstance of the case, while in the latter, the relief afforded is normally money
damages.") Although this "distinction is too simpl[istic], it will "suffice for present purposes." See id. ("This
distinction is too simple . . . since relief in a common-law action seeking issuance of a prerogative writ (such as
mandamus or prohibition) is discretionary.").
62
360 U.S. 25 (1959).
63
Id. at 26.
64
Id.
65
See id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720.
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Louisiana courts.66 At the same time, the Attorney General had issued an opinion in another
"strikingly similar" case stating that such takings were prohibited.67 Given the uncertainty in
Louisiana law, the district judge stayed the proceedings until the Louisiana Supreme Court had
"been afforded an opportunity to interpret" the statute at issue.68 The Fifth Circuit reversed, but
the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had properly exercised its discretion to stay
the suit "pending the institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana."69 Thus, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and reinstated the
district court's stay order.70
The Court first recognized that the case before it was a suit "at law" seeking damages and
that its prior abstention cases were suits in equity.71 The Court stated, however, that its prior
abstention cases "did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure."72 Instead, they were based
on considerations of federal-state comity.73 Thus, the Court explained, it previously had
approved abstention where it was necessary to avoid "serious disruption by federal courts of state
government or needless friction between state and federal authorities."74 The Court concluded
that even though the case at bar was a damages action, abstention was appropriate.75 It reasoned
that because the suit involved eminent domain, a subject that is "intimately involved with [a
state's] sovereign prerogative,"76 abstention was warranted to maintain "harmonious federal-state

66

Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30.
Id.
68
Id. at 26.
69
Id. at 30.
70
Id.
71
See id. at 35.
72
Id. at 28.
73
Id. at 34.
74
Id. at 28.
75
See id. at 30.
76
Id. at 28.
67
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relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State."77 Thus, the Court applied
abstention principles to a suit for damages and reinstated the district court's stay order.78
In upholding the district court's order, the Court emphasized that the lower court "had
only stayed the federal suit pending adjudication of the dispute in state court," rather than
dismissing the suit as the Burford Court had done.79 The Court explained that the district court
would continue to participate in the litigation because once the state court interpreted the statute,
the case would be returned to district court.80 If the state courts upheld the taking, then the
district court would "award compensation."81 Furthermore, if the parties did not file and obtain a
declaratory judgment in a timely fashion, then "the District Court, having retained complete
control of the litigation, [would] doubtless assert it to decide . . . the question of the meaning of
the state statute."82
By stressing that the district court had merely stayed the proceedings, the Thibodaux
Court recognized the distinction between an abstention-based stay and an abstention-based
remand or dismissal.83 Traditionally, courts lacked discretionary power to decline to exercise

77

Id. at 29. As one commentator has explained, "The Supreme Court's focus on comity as the most
essential component in the balance of federal/state interests for federal abstention purposes has allowed [the] Court
to expand the equitable doctrine of abstention to cover suits seeking damages as well as those seeking equitable
relief." Stephanie Dest, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest
Analysis, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 278 (1989).
78
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30. In upholding the district court's stay order, the Supreme Court also
recognized that the Louisiana state courts were "the only tribunal[s] empowered to speak definitively" on the
meaning of the eminent domain statute at issue. Id. at 29. The district court could only "make a dubious and
tentative forecast" as to the proper interpretation of the statute. Id. Thus, if the federal courts interpreted and
applied the statute in the case at bar, then it "would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute [was] construed
as [the federal courts] would construe it, whereas the rights of all other litigants would be thereafter governed by a
decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana different from [the federal courts']." Id. at 30.
79
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29).
80
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. Indeed, the Thibodaux Court distinguished Meredith on the ground
that Meredith involved an abstention-based dismissal, while Thibodaux involved an abstention-based stay. The
Thibodaux Court characterized the issue in Meredith as "whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court"
due to uncertain state law, while the issue in Thibodaux was whether the district judge should be prohibited from
instituting a stay order to seek an interpretation of unclear state law from the Louisiana courts. 360 U.S. at 28 n.2.
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their jurisdiction in suits "at law" except in very limited circumstances and therefore typically
could not dismiss common law damages actions.84 Thus, by analogy, an abstention-based
remand to state court in Thibodaux would have been improper because the defendant sought
compensation for the taking.85 According to the Court, however, the stay in Thibodaux was
acceptable because a stay, unlike a dismissal, does "not constitute abnegation" by a federal court
of its duty to decide the case before it.86 Instead, a stay merely postpones the court's exercise of
its duty to adjudicate the controversy until a later time.87 Thus, while an abstention-based
remand in Thibodaux would have represented an inappropriate abdication of duty, the district
court's abstention-based stay order was a "wise and productive discharge" of its duty to exercise
jurisdiction.88
The Court concluded that a district court properly exercises its discretionary power when it stays proceedings in
order to clarify state law, but not when it dismisses a case for the same reason. See id. at 28 & n.2, 29.
84
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.
85
See Quackenbush, 517 at 722.
86
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
87
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29) (emphasis added).
88
Id. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29). See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S.
593 (1968) (per curiam); County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188. In 1968, the Court decided Kaiser Steel, a case very
similar to Thibodaux. In Kaiser, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction claiming illegal
trespass by the defendant and seeking damages. Id. at 593. The defendant conceded that it had trespassed, but
claimed that a state statute permitted the trespass for the purpose of using water rights the state had granted to it. Id.
Because state law was unclear and the same issues were pending before the state courts in a declaratory judgment
suit, the defendant requested a stay until the state courts clarified the law. See id. at 593-94. Both the district court
and the court of appeals denied the defendant's motion to stay. Id. at 594.
The Supreme Court reversed in a brief per curiam opinion. Id. at 593-94. The Court reasoned that "[t]he
state law issue [was] . . . of vital concern in the arid State of New Mexico, where water is one of the most valuable
natural resources. The issue, moreover, [was] a truly novel one. The question [would] eventually have to be
resolved by the New Mexico courts, and since a declaratory judgment action [was] actually pending there, in all
likelihood that resolution [would] be forthcoming soon. Sound judicial administration requires that the parties in
this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law which will apply to all other businesses and landowners
concerned with the use of this vital state resource." Id. at 594. Thus, the Court remanded the case "with directions
that the action be stayed." Id. The Court concluded its opinion by stating, "Federal jurisdiction will be retained in
the District Court in order to insure a just disposition of this litigation should anything prevent a prompt state court
determination." Id.
Like Thibodaux, Kaiser was a suit for damages. Thus, the abstention-based stay ordered by the Court in
Kaiser, like the stay in Thibodaux, was proper because it would merely postpone the district court's exercise of its
jurisdiction. By staying the proceedings, the district court would not improperly abdicate its duty to decide as it
would if it dismissed the case and remitted the parties to state court.
County of Allegheny, unlike Thibodaux and Kaiser, involved an abstention-based dismissal by a district
court in a diversity suit for damages. In County of Allegheny, the Allegheny County Board of Commissioners
appropriated the plaintiffs' property under the applicable state eminent domain statutes and then leased the property
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Thirty-seven years later in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme Court directly
confronted the question whether federal courts can exercise their discretion to remand or dismiss
suits for damages, as opposed to those for discretionary relief, on abstention grounds.89 In
Quackenbush, the California insurance commissioner sued Allstate Insurance Company in state
court "seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate's alleged breach of certain reinsurance
agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate's obligations under those agreements."90
Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case and filed a motion to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.91 The commissioner then moved for remand,
arguing that the district court should abstain under Burford because its resolution of the case
might interfere with California's regulation of the insurance industry.92 Specifically, the
Commissioner indicated that there was "a hotly disputed question of state law" involved in the
case, and that this question was already pending before the state courts.93

to a company for "its private business use." Id. at 187. The plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction alleging that settled state law prohibited the taking of private property for private, rather than public,
use. Id. at 187-88. They sought ouster of the County and the company from the property, as well as damages.
Although the suit sought damages, the district court in County of Allegheny, in contrast to the district court in
Thibodaux, dismissed the suit "on the ground that it 'should not interfere with the administration of the affairs of a
political subdivision acting under color of State law in a condemnation proceeding.'" Id. at 188. The Third Circuit
reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Thus, while the Court upheld an abstention-based stay in Thibodaux, an eminent domain case where
damages were sought, it would not approve an abstention-based dismissal in County of Allegheny, also an eminent
domain case where damages were sought. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720 (distinguishing “between abstention-based
remand orders or dismissals and abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a federal suit.”).
Furthermore, while Thibodaux and Kaiser are distinguishable because they involved stays while County of
Allegheny involved a dismissal, they also differ from County of Allegheny in that they involved unclear issues of
state law while the state law in County of Allegheny was settled. Id. at 720-21; see also Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("[S]ince the controlling state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is
no occasion in the interest of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication.”).
89
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706.
90
Id. at 709.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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In contrast to the district court in Thibodaux, the district court in Quackenbush remanded
the case to state court on Burford abstention grounds even though it was a suit for damages.94
The district court primarily was concerned that the state and federal courts might rule differently
on the disputed issue of state law and thereby produce inconsistent decisions.95 The Ninth
Circuit reversed,96 and the Supreme Court affirmed.97 The Court concluded that abstentionbased remands or dismissals of damages actions are an improper use of the federal courts'
discretionary power; however, federal courts may apply abstention principles to stay damages
proceedings.98 Because the case at bar was a suit for damages, "the District Court's remand order
was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine."99
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it had long held that federal courts may
dismiss cases where equitable relief is sought and exceptional circumstances are present.100 The
Court also acknowledged that over time it has expanded the power of federal courts to decline to
exercise their jurisdiction to all cases in which discretionary relief is sought and exceptional
circumstances are present.101 The Court pointed out, however, that in prior abstention cases
where damages were sought, it had only permitted the federal court "to enter a stay order that
postpones adjudication of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether."102 Quoting
Thibodaux, the Court again explained that "an order merely staying the action 'does not

94

Id. at 710.
Id. at 709-10.
96
Id. at 710.
97
Id. at 711.
98
Id. at 721.
99
Id. at 731.
100
Id. at 716.
101
Id. at 718.
102
Id. at 719 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28-30).
95
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constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of
it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition.'"103
Thus, the Quackenbush Court confirmed that in suits "at law," federal courts do not have
the power to remand or dismiss on abstention grounds.104 If they take such action in suits for
damages, they improperly abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction.105 Federal courts do,
however, have the power to "apply[] abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay" and
send the parties to state court for resolution of a state law issue.106 A stay in a suit at law, in
contrast to a remand or dismissal, does not constitute the "abnegation of judicial duty"; a stay is
merely a postponement of adjudication.107
C.

ABSTENTION TODAY

Federal courts abstain only in exceptional circumstances.108 They do so "out of deference
to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and
federalism."109 The Court has recognized that under its abstention case law, various types of
abstention exist.110 While the Court has warned that the abstention doctrines "are not rigid
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases,"111 there are nevertheless separate
categories of abstention today. Three of these categories – Pullman abstention, Thibodaux
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Id. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29).
Id.
105
See id.
106
Id. at 730.
107
Id. at 721. The Quackenbush Court stated at the end of its opinion that because it was deciding only the
question of whether the district court's dismissal was appropriate, it was "unnecessary to determine whether a more
limited abstention-based stay order would have been warranted on the facts of [the] case." Id. at 731. Nevertheless,
the Court speculated that "Burford might support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages
action pending the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law." Id. at 730. The Court reasoned
that it might have been appropriate for the district court to enter a stay in the case at bar given the disputed issue of
state law involved "and in the interest of avoiding inconsistent adjudications on that point." Id. at 731.
108
Id. at 716.
109
Id. at 723.
110
See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813-817 (Supreme Court "decisions have confined the circumstances
appropriate for abstention to three general categories.").
111
New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359-60.
104
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abstention, and Burford abstention – are pertinent to this Article, and they are summarized
below.112
First, federal courts abstain under Pullman "'in cases presenting a federal constitutional
issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of
pertinent state law.'"113 When a federal court abstains in these circumstances, it stays the
proceedings in federal court even though the plaintiff typically seeks equitable relief and the
court therefore has the discretionary power to dismiss. The court does so in order to preserve the
federal constitutional issue for decision in a federal forum.114
Pullman abstention is inappropriate, however, when state law is clear.115 In addition, it is
improper when the statute at issue is not "'fairly subject to an interpretation which will render

112

The other two main categories of abstention are Younger abstention and Colorado River abstention.
When federal courts engage in Younger abstention, they refrain "from hearing cases that would interfere with a
pending state criminal proceeding, or with certain types of state civil proceedings." Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716
(citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977)). When federal courts engage in Colorado River abstention, they "refrain from hearing cases . . .
which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding." Id. at 717 (citing Colo. River, 424 U.S. 800; Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935)). The Court has also approved of abstention in "cases whose resolution by a federal
court might unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes." Id. (citing Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)).
113
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 189). As Judge Friendly
explained, "One type of case almost universally recognized as appropriate for abstention is that of a state statute, not
yet construed by the state courts, which is susceptible of one construction that would render it free from federal
constitutional objection and another that would not. A federal court should not place itself in the position of holding
the statute unconstitutional by giving it the latter construction, only to find that the highest court of the state will
render the decision futile and unnecessary by adopting the former. Such a decision not only is a waste of judicial
resources but provokes a needless collision between state and federal power." Henry J. Friendly, Federal
Jurisdiction: A General View 93 (1973).
114
See, e.g., Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501 (stating that the district court should not abstain unless the
constitutional claim could be fully protected while the state law issue was resolved in state court); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980) ("Where a plaintiff properly invokes federal-court jurisdiction in the first instance on a
federal claim, the federal court has a duty to accept that jurisdiction. Abstention may serve only to postpone rather
than to abdicate[] jurisdiction, since its purpose is to determine whether resolution of the federal question is even
necessary, or to obviate the risk of a federal court's erroneous construction of state law."); Eng. v. La. State Bd. of
Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 464 (1964) (stating that compelling a litigant who properly asserts federal
constitutional claims in a federal district court to have those claims decided by a state court "would be at war with
the unqualified terms in which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific categories
of jurisdiction upon the federal courts" and with the duty of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction when it is
properly invoked).
115
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 469 (1987).
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unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.'"116 Even if the state
courts have never interpreted the statute, a federal court should not abstain under Pullman "[i]f
the statute is not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction."117
Second, federal courts abstain under Thibodaux when a case "rais[es] issues 'intimately
involved with [the States'] sovereign prerogative,' the proper adjudication of which might be
impaired by unsettled questions of state law."118 At least in diversity cases, however, abstentionbased remands or dismissals based solely on unclear state law are not permitted under
Thibodaux.119
Finally, federal courts abstain under Burford when "the State's interests in maintaining
uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem, and retaining local control over
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import" outweigh
"the strong federal interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights,
adjudicated in federal court."120 While there is no "formulaic test for determining when
dismissal under Burford is appropriate,"121 the exercise of discretion must, as with the other
abstention doctrines, "reflect 'principles of federalism and comity.'"122
116

Id. at 468 (quoting Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965)).
Id.
118
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716-17 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28); see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. at
814 (citing Thibodaux and Kaiser for the proposition that abstention is "appropriate where there have been presented
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar").
119
See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816 (citing Meredith, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) ("[T]he mere potential for
conflict in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.")).
120
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Burford abstention is sometimes placed in the same category as Thibodaux abstention. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at
814-15 (discussing Burford abstention in the same category as Thibodaux abstention). But see New Orleans Public
Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359-60 ("While we acknowledge that the various types of abstention are not rigid
pigeonholes into which the federal courts must try to fit cases, the policy considerations supporting Burford are
sufficiently distinct to justify independent analyses.") (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
121
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727.
122
Id. at 727-28 (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). In dicta, the Quackenbush Court
concluded that Burford abstention was inappropriate on the facts of that case. Id. at 731. The Court reasoned that
federal interests were strong, while the state interests were comparatively weak. Specifically, "Allstate's motion to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act implicate[d] a substantial federal concern for the enforcement
117
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When a federal court decides that a case falls into one of the abstention categories and
abstention is appropriate, the court must also decide whether to grant an abstention-based
dismissal or remand or an abstention-based stay. To make this decision, the court must consider
the type of relief sought in the case. As the Quackenbush Court explained, "in cases where the
relief being sought is equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have
the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit or
remanding it to state court."123 In damages actions, however, federal courts do not have the
power to dismiss or remand based on abstention principles.124 They can only postpone the
exercise of their jurisdiction by entering an abstention-based stay and remitting the parties to
state court.125

III.

THE SUPREME COURT AND CERTIFICATION
While the Supreme Court has approved of abstention-based stays, it also has recognized

that sending the parties to state court to endure "a full round of litigation"126 is costly for both the
judicial system and the litigants. Thus, the Court has endorsed the use of certification in at least

of arbitration agreements." Id. at 708. On the state interest side of the equation, however, the case appeared "to
present nothing more than a run-of-the-mill contract dispute." Id. at 729. Furthermore, by the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, the "hotly contested" issue of state law had been resolved by the California Supreme Court. Id.
at 729. Consequently, there was no longer a concern that the federal and states courts would rule inconsistently on
the issue. See id. at 729-30. Thus, the Court concluded "that the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted
application of the Burford doctrine." Id. at 731. The Court acknowledged, however, that because it was deciding
only whether the district court's abstention-based dismissal in a damages suit was proper, it did not "find it necessary
to inquire fully as to whether this case presents the sort of 'exceptional circumstance' in which Burford abstention or
other grounds for yielding federal jurisdiction might be appropriate." Id.
123
Id. at 721.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. at 76.
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some federal question cases and in diversity suits.127 Certification is a "procedure" that allows a
federal court faced with an unsettled issue of state law to stay its proceedings and "put the
question directly to the State's highest court."128 In contrast to abstention, it "does not require
litigating a new lawsuit through state appellate review."129 As a result, it is both faster and less
expensive than granting an abstention-based stay.130 In addition, because certified questions are
sent directly to a state's highest court, certification "increase[es] the assurance of gaining an
authoritative response" from the only court that can provide one.131 Accordingly, "certification
of novel or unsettled questions of state law . . . may save 'time, energy, and resources and hel[p]
build a cooperative judicial federalism.'"132
Today, almost all states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico permit
certification.133 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has employed certification in federal
question cases.134 In the federal question context, the Court has provided some guidance to the
lower courts regarding when certification is appropriate. Specifically, the Court has suggested
that certification is warranted in a federal question case where Pullman abstention otherwise
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See infra Part III.A. and B.
Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76. For a discussion of the history of certification and an
overview of the certification procedure, see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress's
Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of
State Law, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 649, 650-59 (1999).
129
Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New
York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 381 (2000).
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Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 77 (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)).
133
Only two states, Arkansas and North Carolina, do not have a certification procedure. While Missouri
has a certification statute, Mo. Stat. Ann. § 477.004 (Vernon Supp. 2006), the Missouri Supreme Court has declined
to answer certified questions on the ground that the Missouri Constitution does not permit it to do so. See Zeman v.
V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc., 911 F.2d 107, 109 (8th Cir. 1990) ("On July 13, 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that, notwithstanding the certification statute, the Missouri constitution did not grant the Missouri Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to render opinions on questions of law certified by federal courts and declined to answer the
certified question.")
134
See infra Part III.A.
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would be justified.135 In the diversity context, however, the Court has provided little guidance to
the lower courts regarding the circumstances under which certification is appropriate.
A.

FEDERAL QUESTION CERTIFICATION

The Supreme Court primarily has addressed certification in the context of federal
constitutional litigation involving state statutes. The Court has said that "[c]ertification today
covers territory once dominated by . . . Pullman abstention."136 Thus, the Court has endorsed
the use of certification in the same circumstances in which it has approved Pullman abstention137
and has certified questions itself or remanded cases for certification on Pullman grounds.138
Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished certification from abstention, suggesting that the Court

135

Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997) ("Certification today covers territory once
dominated by . . . 'Pullman abstention.'").
136
Id. at 75.
137

E.g., id. at 76 (stating that the availability of certification makes it unnecessary for the parties to institute
a new lawsuit in state court in order to obtain clarification of "state-law questions antecedent to federal
constitutional issues").
138
See, e.g., Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157, 157-58 (2001) (per curiam) (certifying in a federal habeas
corpus death penalty case where the district court and court of appeals had interpreted a state rule of criminal
procedure differently and where under one interpretation the prisoner's constitutional claims would be waived, but
under the other interpretation the claims could be heard on the merits); see id. at 159-60 (stating that the state
supreme court's answer to the certified question would "help determine the proper state-law predicate for [the
Court's] determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in [the] case"); Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23
(1999) (certifying a question in a federal habeas corpus case where interpretation of state law would determine
whether petitioner's conviction would be set aside); see id. at 29 (stating that the state supreme court's answer to the
certified question would "help determine the proper state-law predicate for [the Court's] determination of the federal
constitutional questions raised in [the] case"); Va. v. Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. 383, 386 (1988) (certifying two
questions in a First Amendment case where "an authoritative construction of the Virginia statute by the Virginia
Supreme Court would substantially aid [the Court's] review of [the] constitutional holding [below], and might well
determine the case entirely"); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 650-51, 661-62 & n.15 (1978) (certifying a question
of state common law because the constitutional issues could not be resolved without first deciding the state law
question as to which there were no controlling state law precedents, and there had been no showing that a
constitutional decision was necessary); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 133, 148 (1976) (remanding for certification
of state law questions regarding the proper construction of a state statute that was susceptible to "an interpretation
[that] would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute"); see also Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963).
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would approve the use of certification in federal question cases other than those that satisfy the
criteria for Pullman abstention.139
In its earliest certification case involving a federal constitutional question, Clay v. Sun
Insurance Co.,140 the Supreme Court appeared to sanction the use of certification to resolve
unclear issues of state law where Pullman abstention otherwise would be warranted. In Clay, the
plaintiff bought an insurance policy from the defendant when he was a citizen of Illinois.141 The
defendant was licensed to do business in Illinois and several other states, including Florida.142
The policy provided for world-wide coverage against personal property loss and "required that
suit on any claim for loss must be brought within twelve months of the discovery of the loss."143
After the plaintiff bought the policy, he moved to Florida and suffered personal property
damage.144 The defendant refused to pay, and the plaintiff filed suit in federal court more than
two years after he discovered his loss.145 The defendant defended, in pertinent part, on the
ground "that under the time limitation for bringing suit, a restriction concededly valid under
Illinois law, the suit was barred."146
The district court applied Florida's "five-year limitation for actions on written contracts,"
and the case went to trial.147 The court of appeals reversed on the ground that application of
Florida's statute of limitations to a contract made in Illinois violated the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.148 In the process of reaching its decision, the court considered whether
Florida's statute of limitations applied to the policy.149 The court did not decide "this threshold
139

See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79.
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question," however, apparently because "it could not, on the available materials, make a
confident guess how the Florida Supreme Court would construe the statute."150 Instead, the court
would decide the constitutional issue "that [was] presented only if the statute did apply."151
Relying on the "doctrine that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it,"152 the Clay Court found that, because resolution of the
state law issue could have ended the suit, the court of appeals should have decided the state law
issues first and then, only if necessary, decided the due process issue.153 The Court explained
that the requirement that courts decide constitutional questions only if necessary is "a wellsettled doctrine . . . which, because it carries a special weight in maintaining proper harmony in
federal-state relations, must not yield to the claim of the relatively minor inconvenience of
postponement of decision.”154 The Court ultimately vacated the court of appeals' decision and
remanded the case for determination of the state law questions.155
In doing so, the Court recognized that the case involved unclear issues of state law.156
The Court noted, however, that "[t]he Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, ha[d] dealt with
the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by
a statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the
Supreme Court of Florida for its decision."157 The Court further noted that even where
certification statutes were unavailable it had "frequently deemed it appropriate, where a federal
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constitutional question might be mooted thereby, to secure an authoritative state court's
determination of an unresolved question of its local law."158 Thus, in a case with facts very
similar to Pullman,159 the Court seemed to suggest that since Florida had a certification statute,
the lower court should consider certifying the unclear questions of state law on remand rather
than engaging in abstention.
In contrast, in City of Houston v. Hill160 the Court refused to abstain or certify under
Pullman. In Hill, the Court faced "the question whether a municipal ordinance that makes it
unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties is unconstitutionally
overbroad under the First Amendment.”161 The City asked the Court to abstain under Pullman,
and the Court refused.162 The Court explained that abstention was inappropriate in the case at
bar because the ordinance at issue was "not susceptible to a limiting construction" that would
render it constitutional.163 The court rejected the argument that abstention was warranted
because the state courts had never construed the statute.164 The Court noted first that while the
state appellate courts had not interpreted the statute, "Houston's Municipal Courts . . . [had] had
numerous opportunities to narrow the scope of the ordinance."165 The Court also said that even
where no state court has interpreted a statute, a federal court need not abstain if the statute is
158

Id. (citing Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959); Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943)).
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See supra Part II.A.
160
482 U.S. 451 (1987).
161
Id. at 453.
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Id. at 467, 468.
163
Id. at 468. In reaching its decision, the Court said that it was "particularly reluctant to abstain in cases
involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment," but "[e]ven if [the] case did not involve a facial
challenge under the First Amendment, [it] would find abstention inappropriate." Id. at 467. In a footnote, the Court
also commented on the lateness of the City's request for abstention. Id. at n.16. The Court noted that the City "did
not raise the abstention issue until after it had lost on the merits before the panel of the Court of Appeals." Id. Until
that point, the City had argued "that the ordinance was both unambiguous and constitutional on its face." Id. The
Court said that "[t]hese circumstances undercut the force of the city's argument, but [did] not bar [the Court] from
considering it." Id.
164
Id. at 469-70.
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Id. at 470 ("[W]here municipal courts have regularly applied an unambiguous statute, there is certainly
no need for a federal court to abstain until state appellate courts have an opportunity to construe it.").
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unambiguous.166 Thus, the Court concluded, "If [a] statute is not obviously susceptible of a
limiting construction, then even if the statute has 'never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal . . .
it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.'"167
The Hill Court also emphasized that "[t]he possibility of certification d[id] not change
[its] analysis."168 The Court noted that "certification . . . is useful in reducing the substantial
burdens of cost and delay that abstention places on litigants."169 The Court explained, however,
that certification, like Pullman abstention, is inappropriate "where . . . there is no uncertain
question of state law whose resolution might affect the pending federal claim."170 Thus, because
the ordinance in the case at bar was "neither ambiguous nor obviously susceptible of a limiting
construction," the Court could discern no reason to abstain or certify under Pullman.171
More recently, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,172 the Supreme Court
discussed certification at length in dicta and suggested that the lower courts should have certified
the state law question at issue based on Pullman abstention principles. In Arizonans, Arizona
amended its state constitution to provide that English was "'the official language of the State of
Arizona' – 'the language of . . . all government functions and actions.'"173 The plaintiff, a state
employee who spoke both English and Spanish, filed suit in federal court alleging that the
amendment violated the U.S. Constitution.174 The district court and the Ninth Circuit held that
166

Id. at 469.
Id. (quoting Harman, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)).
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Id. at 471.
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Id. at 470-71; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000) (refusing to certify in a case
where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state abortion statute that had not been construed by the state
courts because, inter alia, "[c]ertification of a question (or abstention) is appropriate only where the statute is 'fairly
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the amendment was unconstitutional.175 Despite the state Attorney General's request and the fact
that the Arizona Supreme Court had not interpreted the amendment, the lower courts refused to
certify the question of the amendment's proper interpretation.176 The lower courts reasoned that
certification was unwarranted because the language of the amendment was "plain" and "the
Attorney General's limiting construction unpersuasive."177
The Supreme Court declared the case moot because the plaintiff had left her job as a state
employee for a private position during the course of the litigation.178 Nonetheless, the Court
went on to reprimand the district court and the Ninth Circuit for failing to certify "[g]iven the
novelty of the question and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona’s business, plus
the views of the Attorney General and [the amendment's sponsors]"179 that a limiting
construction of the statute was possible.180
Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principles underlying Pullman abstention.181 It
explained that in order to avoid "premature adjudication of constitutional questions" and
"friction-generating error," federal courts should be very careful about deciding the
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Id. The court's discourse on certification is interesting given its decision that the case was moot. The
Court did not stop at chastising the lower courts and discussing certification at length in dicta. The Court went to
some lengths to ensure that the federal system left no footprints on the state constitutional amendment at issue.
First, the Court did not simply dismiss the suit. See id. at 75. Instead, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. Id. at 80. By vacating the Ninth Circuit's
judgment, the Court effectively erased that court's interpretation of the amendment. Furthermore, the Court
specifically stated that it "express[ed] no view on the correct interpretation of" the amendment or its
constitutionality. Id. at 48-49. At the time the federal suit reached the Supreme Court, the question of the proper
interpretation of the statute was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 63 n.18. The state case had been
stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision. Id. The Supreme Court noted that given its decision, the Arizona
Supreme Court could "rule definitively on the proper construction" of the amendment. Id. at 80. The Court opined
that once the state supreme court had ruled, "adjudication of any remaining federal constitutional question may
indeed become greatly simplified." Id.
181
See discussion of Pullman supra Part II.A.
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constitutionality of state statutes that have not been construed by the state's highest court.182 The
Court said, "'Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of
prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to
address questions of state law on certification from a federal court.'"183 The Court concluded that
the district court and the Ninth Circuit should have been more "cautious" in approaching the
question whether certification was appropriate.184 Thus, the Court endorsed the use of
certification in a case that otherwise satisfied the criteria for Pullman abstention because it
involved a state statute that had never been interpreted and might be construed by the state courts
so as to moot the constitutional issue.
Despite the Court's statement that "[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated
by . . . Pullman abstention"185 and its endorsement of certification in cases, like Arizonans, that
are similar to Pullman, the Court has not explicitly limited certification in federal question cases
to federal constitutional litigation. Moreover, in Arizonans, the Court specifically distinguished
certification from abstention. Echoing the "exceptional circumstances" language of the
abstention doctrines, the Ninth Circuit in Arizonans "found 'no unique circumstances . . .
militating in favor of certification.'"186 The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had
improperly "[b]lend[ed] abstention with certification."187 The Court then stated unequivocally,
"Novel, unsettled questions of state law, however, not 'unique circumstances,' are necessary
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Id. at 79.
Id. at 79 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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Id. at 77.
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Id. at 79 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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before federal courts may avail themselves of state certification procedures."188 It is unclear
whether the Arizonans Court intended to sanction the use of certification in federal question
cases whenever "novel, unsettled questions of state law" are involved, regardless of the
underlying circumstances of the case. The Court's statement, however, seems to suggest that it
has opened the door to that interpretation.
B.

DIVERSITY CERTIFICATION

In the diversity context, the Supreme Court has addressed certification in only one case:
Lehman Brothers v. Schein.189 Lehman involved three shareholders' derivative suits that were
filed in federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and consolidated on appeal.190
The district court concluded that Florida law applied to the disputes and that, under Florida law,
the cases must be dismissed.191 Although the court of appeals found that Florida law was
unclear, it nonetheless reversed the district court and held that under Florida law the plaintiffs
could recover.192
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cases
so that the court could "reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be
certified to the Florida Supreme Court."193 The Court said that certification seemed "particularly
appropriate in view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law."194
The Court made clear, however, that even where state law is unclear and certification is
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Id. The Court noted, as it had previously, that certification does not "entail the delay[], expense, and
procedural complexity that generally attend[s] abstention decisions" and that "[t]aking advantage of certification . . .
may 'greatly simplif[y]' an ultimate adjudication in federal court." Id. (quoting Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 151).
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416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
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Id. at 387.
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Id. at 388-89.
192
Id. at 389.
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Id. at 391-92.
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available, certification is not mandatory.195 Rather, the Court said that the decision whether to
use certification "in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court."196
By remanding Lehman for consideration of whether certification was warranted, the
Supreme Court endorsed the used of certification under the same circumstances in which it had
rejected abstention in Meredith.197 Meredith, like Lehman was a diversity case that involved
unclear state law.198 The court of appeals in Meredith dismissed the case because it believed that
the case should be decided in a state forum.199 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
on the ground that abstention is inappropriate where state law is uncertain but where there are no
exceptional circumstances present.200 As the Lehman Court explained, Meredith "teaches that
the mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state
tribunal for the start of another lawsuit."201 Thus, by sanctioning the use of certification in
Lehman under circumstances in which it would not have approved of abstention, the Court
implicitly distinguished certification in diversity cases from abstention in diversity cases.
Furthermore, by specifically stating in Lehman that the difficulty of state law will not support
sending the parties to state court "for the start of another lawsuit"202 and yet approving
certification, the Court suggested that certification where state law is unclear is proper precisely
because it does not require a full round of litigation in state court.
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IV.

CERTIFICATION BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS IN DIVERSITY CASES
Given the Court's suggestion in both federal question and diversity cases that certification

and abstention are two separate doctrines203 and the Court's apparent endorsement in Lehman of
certification in diversity cases where state law is unclear,204 it would be reasonable to expect that
federal appellate courts205 would have adopted the "Lehman approach" to certification in
diversity cases. Surprisingly, however, the circuits generally have not done so. Instead, at least
six of the circuits tend to rely on abstention principles derived from the Thibodaux and Burford
abstention doctrines to determine when they should certify.206 In particular, these courts require
"exceptional circumstances" before they will certify. The First Circuit, on the other hand, takes a
dual approach to certification, employing both the abstention-based approach and the Lehman
approach to certification. Four circuits appear to lean exclusively toward the Lehman
approach,207 while one circuit, the Tenth, takes an ad hoc approach that is impossible to
classify.208 In addition, all of the circuits, at times, also consider "secondary" factors in deciding
whether to certify.209
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See supra Part III.A. and B.
See supra Part III.B.
205
For purposes of this Article, the phrases "federal circuit courts" and "federal appellate courts" refer to
the First through Eleventh Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit.
206
See supra Part II.A-C. The circuits that rely on abstention principles to determine when certification is
appropriate are the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
207
These circuits are the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.
208
The Tenth Circuit has said, in more than one diversity case, that "certification is appropriate 'where the
legal question at issue is novel and the applicable state law is unsettled.'" Enfield v. A.B. Chance Co., 228 F.3d
1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also Pehle
v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 897, 900 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (same). In the cases where the court has made
this statement, however, it has declined to certify. E.g., id. at 900 n.1 (declining to certify because state law was
settled); Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255 (declining to certify because the party "did not seek certification until after it
received an adverse decision from the district court"); Brown, 920 F.2d at 667 (declining to certify because state law
was settled). Thus, these cases do not necessarily indicate that the Tenth Circuit will certify when state law is
uncertain.
Furthermore, in discussing certification, the Tenth Circuit has quoted Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228 (1943) for the proposition that federal courts have a duty to decide state law issues absent exceptional
circumstances. Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Meredith, 320 U.S. at
235) (reviewing the district court's refusal to certify); see also Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255) (quoting Copier, 138 F.3d
204
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A.

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND ABSTENTION-BASED
CERTIFICATION

The District of Columbia, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits use an
abstention-based approach to certification. In deciding whether to certify in diversity cases,
these circuits commonly ask (1) whether state law is unsettled and (2) whether an interest of
sufficient importance to the State is involved. In analyzing the second factor, the circuits are
concerned about whether considerations of federal-state comity indicate that the issue before
them is one that warrants certification. Accordingly, like the Thibodaux and Burford Courts, the
circuits examine whether the issue is "intimately" related to the state's "sovereign prerogative,"
whether the issue is one of "vital public concern," whether the state has an interest in
"maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem," or whether the state
has an interest in "retaining local control over difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import."210 While the circuits do not often use this precise
language from the abstention cases to describe the second factor, they do employ very similar
language and appear to be equating certification with abstention by, in effect, requiring
exceptional circumstances before they will certify. For the most part, however, the circuits do

at 838) ("'[U]nder the diversity statutes the federal courts have the duty to decide questions of state law even if
difficult or uncertain.'"). Confusingly, however, the Tenth Circuit has also recognized that in Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, the Supreme Court said that "[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law, . . . not
unique circumstances,' are necessary before federal courts" can certify." Copier, 138 F.3d at 839 (quoting
Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79). To complicate matters further, in most, if not all, of its published certification cases, the
Tenth Circuit has declined to certify for myriad reasons, none of which are related to whether the issue involved is
sufficiently important to the State. Given the Tenth Circuit's contradictory statements regarding whether it follows
the Lehman approach or an abstention-based approach to certification and the lack of case law establishing that it
follows either method, it is impossible to classify the court's approach. Due to the lack of diversity cases in which
the Tenth Circuit has certified, perhaps the most that can be said is that the court is very reluctant to certify and
views certification with great circumspection.
209
These factors are (1) whether the issue is or may be dispositive, (2) the likely recurrence of the issue, (3)
the timing of the request for certification, (4) whether the party requesting certification chose the federal forum, and
(5) whether the denial of certification will lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws. They
are "secondary" because the circuits sometimes apply them and sometimes ignore them. In addition, a factor that
receives weight in one case may not be mentioned in another case. The secondary factors are discussed infra Part V.
210
Supra Part II.C.
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not acknowledge that they are relying on abstention principles or explain their reasoning for
taking this approach to certification.
The District of Columbia Circuit provides an illustration of the abstention-based
approach to certification. The D.C. Circuit certifies where state law is "'genuinely uncertain'
with respect to the dispositive question and . . . the case 'is one of extreme public importance.'"211
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richardson,212 for example, the plaintiff worked as a
security guard in an apartment complex managed by a District of Columbia company.213 The
company purchased a comprehensive general liability insurance policy from Nationwide for the
apartment complex.214 The policy included a pollution exclusion clause which "exclude[d]
liability coverage for injuries or damage arising out of events involving the release or escape of
'pollutants.'"215 While the plaintiff worked at the complex, she allegedly was exposed to carbon
monoxide that leaked from one or more gas furnaces.216 The plaintiff sued the company in state
court claiming that she was injured from exposure to carbon monoxide fumes.217 Nationwide
then filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court in the District of Columbia
"seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify"218 the company because
the pollution exclusion clause barred coverage for the plaintiff's alleged injuries.219 The district
court agreed with Nationwide and granted its motion for summary judgment.220
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Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Dial A Car, Inc. v.
Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Cf. Karen LeCraft Henderson, Certification: (Over)due
Deference?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1995) (stating that, in the D.C. Circuit, the decision whether to certify
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit certified the question whether "the pollution exclusion clause
appl[ied] to injuries arising from alleged carbon monoxide poisoning" to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.221 The court reasoned that certification was warranted because
District of Columbia law was genuinely uncertain: The District of Columbia courts had not
addressed the scope of the pollution exclusion clause, and other jurisdictions that had interpreted
similar clauses had reached conflicting conclusions.222 The court further reasoned that it should
certify because "the question [was] one of significant import to the public."223 The clause was a
common feature of commercial comprehensive general liability policies, and its interpretation
therefore "potentially affect[ed] the insurance coverage of most businesses in the District of
Columbia."224 Thus, in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit essentially applied abstention principles to
determine whether certification was appropriate.225
The Second Circuit's approach to certification, like the D.C. Circuit's, demonstrates the
use of certification as a proxy for abstention in diversity cases. Interestingly, the Second Circuit
has stated specifically that certification is proper "only where there is a split of authority on the
issue, where [a] statute's plain language does not indicate the answer, or when presented with a
complex question of [state] common law for which no [state] authority can be found."226 This
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Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 952.
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For other diversity cases in which the D.C. Circuit has used abstention principles to decide whether to
certify, see Dial A Car, Inc., 132 F.3d at 746 (declining to certify the question of whether there was a private right of
action under a District of Columbia statute because the "precedent regarding implied private rights of action [was]
reasonably clear" and the case "[was] not one of 'extreme public importance' in the District of Columbia."); Joy v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (certifying a question regarding "the conditions
under which . . . police officers will be held liable in tort for actions taken in the course of performing their public
functions" because state law was genuinely uncertain and the case was one of extreme public importance); Eli Lilly
and Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (certifying where state law was uncertain and "the
State . . . ha[d] a very substantial interest in [the] dispute").
226
Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1992). In a case decided five years
after Riordan the Second Circuit said, "Riordan establishes the standard applicable in this Circuit for determining
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suggests that the Second Circuit has adopted the Lehman approach to certification in diversity
cases and asks only whether state law is sufficiently unclear in deciding whether to certify.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit usually considers not only whether state law is unclear, but also
whether the issue involves important state public policy considerations.227 Thus, in deciding
whether to certify in a diversity case, the Second Circuit actually uses a standard that is similar to
the D.C. Circuit's that also appears to be derived from abstention principles.228
Very recently, for example, in Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network,229 the
Second Circuit certified several "novel questions of [state] statutory interpretation" that involved
an "important and sensitive area of state law and policy" to the New York Court of Appeals.230
The plaintiff in Colavito had end-stage renal disease.231 When he did not receive a kidney that
allegedly had been directly donated to him, he brought suit in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction against the New York Organ Donor Network ("NYODN") and two NYODN

whether it is appropriate to certify a question to a state court." McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1997).
227
See, e.g., Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, 438 F.3d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Where unsettled
and significant questions of state law will control the outcome of a case, we may certify those questions.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 396 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2005) (certifying where
the case involved "unsettled and significant" issues of state law); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 25-26 (2d Cir.
2003) ("[I]n deciding whether to certify . . . this Court looks to both the extent of existing state precedent and the
nature of the questions to be asked. In particular, whether to certify a question depends to some extent upon whether
the question implicates issues of state public policy.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); City of
Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying questions because the state courts had not
yet ruled on the issues and because the issues involved "important public policy considerations" for the state); N.Y.
Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 750, 756 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying a "significant and novel public policy
question").
228
See, e.g,, DiBella v. Hopkins,, 403 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We do not believe this case presents
any of the exceptional circumstances that would justify using the certification procedure.") (emphasis added);
Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that certification is a "valuable device for
securing prompt and authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law, especially those that seem likely to
recur and to have significance beyond the interests of the parties in a particular lawsuit."). Cf. Judith S. Kaye &
Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373,
397-422 (2000) (discussing New York's experience with certification).
229
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officials.232 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had engaged in fraud and had committed
the common law tort of conversion by violating New York Public Health Law.233 The plaintiff
also asserted a private right of action under New York Public Health Law.234 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the fraud claim, but
"reserve[d] decision on the remaining issues" and certified several questions.235
Specifically, the Second Circuit said that before it reached the merits of the plaintiff's
other claims, it had to determine whether those claims even existed under state public health
law.236 After examining the statutory sections at issue, the court concluded that it could not
determine whether the claims "[gave] rise to enforceable rights for individuals."237 The court
ultimately held that certification was appropriate because the statutory language was ambiguous,
and there was very little pertinent case law interpreting the statutory provisions.238 In addition,
the court reasoned that certification was justified because it did not have the "experience,
expertise, or authority" to ascertain the public policy underlying the statutes at issue.239
According to the court, the goal behind the statutes—increasing organ donation—could be
achieved either by protecting "organ procurement organizations from liability or by giving
donors and donees enforceable rights to remedy and deter misconduct."240 The court concluded
that "it would be imprudent to embark on an excursion . . . into the state statutory incentive
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structure in this important and sensitive area of state law and policy."241 Therefore, after
applying abstention principles, the Second Circuit determined that certification was warranted.242
A case from the Seventh Circuit, Doe v. American National Red Cross,243 provides an
additional compelling example of a court's tacit use of abstention principles to decide whether to
certify.244 The Doe court certified the question of "[w]hether a blood bank, sued in negligence
for failing properly to screen donors and test blood or blood products, is 'a person who is a health
care provider' within the meaning of the Wisconsin medical malpractice statute of limitations."245
Using abstention language without citing abstention cases, the court said that certification was
appropriate because the issue "concern[ed] a matter of vital public concern" and "an appropriate
respect for the prerogatives and responsibilities of Wisconsin" required that the state supreme
court decide the issue.246 The Doe court further reasoned that certification was justified because,
inter alia, state law was uncertain.247 Thus, the Doe court, like the Richardson and Colavito
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976 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1992).
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While the Seventh Circuit has said that it considers multiple factors in deciding whether to certify,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, 285 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2002), its case law (including Doe) indicates that the court
primarily considers whether state law is uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently important to the State. See,
e.g., id. at 638-39 (certifying a question about the applicable statute of limitations primarily because the intermediate
appellate courts were in conflict, the state supreme court "[had] not had an opportunity to address the question
squarely," and "[s]tatutes of limitations reflect significant policy choices by the state and have grave consequences
for the administration of justice within the state"); Valerio v. Home Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 226, 229 (7th Cir. 1996)
(certifying a question regarding the proper interpretation of a phrase in an insurance policy because the answer
would "control the outcome of [the] appeal;" the state courts had "not yet construed [the] phrase, which [was]
common to many policies;" and the state had a "significant interest in the interpretation and enforcement of
insurance policies executed within its borders"); Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1995) (certifying
where there were no state decisions on point and the question had "important implications for the state").
245
Doe, 976 F.2d at 376.
246
Id. at 374; see Kaiser, 391 U.S. 593, 595 (1968) (finding that the lower courts should have abstained
because, inter alia, the issue was one of "vital concern" to the state); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (approving abstention because, inter alia, the state law issue was "intimately involved with
[the state's] sovereign prerogative"). For a detailed discussion of Kaiser and Thibodaux, see supra Part II.B.
247
Doe, 976 F.2d at 375. The Doe court also found that certification was appropriate because allowing the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide the question would "ensure that Wisconsin's public policy [was], from the
outset, applied evenhandedly to all litigants whether they [found] themselves in a state or federal forum," and the
answer to the certified question would determine whether the cause of action survived. Id. at 374; see infra Part V.
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courts, required "exceptional circumstances," as well as uncertain state law, before it would
certify.248
B.

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND THE LEHMAN APPROACH TO
CERTIFICATION
1.

The Dual Approach to Certification

In contrast to the circuits that seem to equate certification with abstention, the First,
Circuit uses a somewhat schizophrenic approach to certification. It sometimes applies abstention

248

Like the D.C Circuit, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have applied abstention
principles in multiple cases to decide whether certification is justified.
The Third Circuit has taken a somewhat circuitous route to adopting its certification factors. Judge Becker
first wrote in dissent that "a federal court should be authorized to certify a question of law to the state court when:
(1) the issue is one of importance; (2) it may be determinative of the litigation; and (3) state law does not provide
controlling precedent through which the federal court could resolve the issue." Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal
Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting). In Hakimoglu, the court faced the question of
"whether under New Jersey law a casino patron may recover from a casino for gambling losses caused by the
casino's conduct in serving alcoholic beverages to the patron and allowing the patron to continue to gamble after it
becomes obvious that the patron is intoxicated." Id. at 292. According to Judge Becker, Hakimoglu was a "textbook
case for certification" because the issue was "determinative of the litigation; important public policy issues [were] at
stake; and little authority guide[d] [the court's] decision." Id. at 304.
Although Judge Becker proposed his certification factors in dissent, the other panel judges, Nygaard and
Alito, joined the part of Judge Becker's dissent that discussed certification "and enthusiastically endorse[d] his
recommendations therein." Id. at 293 n.2. Nonetheless, certification was not an option in Hakimoglu because the
case involved New Jersey law and, at that time, New Jersey did not have a certification procedure. See id. at 304
(Becker, J., dissenting). Thus, even though Judges Nygaard and Alito joined the section of Judge Becker's dissent
on certification to form a majority, Judge Becker's proposed certification factors were merely dicta.
Since Hakimoglu, however, the Third Circuit appears to have adopted Judge Becker's factors for deciding
whether certification is proper. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. DiBartolo, 171 F.3d 168, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999)
(declining to certify because "the issue was neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently difficult to command the
attention" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court); see also Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 426 F.3d 671, 675 (3d Cir.
2005) (certifying in a federal question case because it could not "predict with confidence how the [state] Supreme
Court would decide the issues presented" and because "the questions of law certified [were] of . . . substantial public
importance").
For cases demonstrating that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits generally apply abstention principles in diversity
cases to determine whether certification is warranted, see, e.g., Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P.,
381 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Because the issue whether punitive damages awards are insurable under Texas
public policy is significant for Texas law and because the Texas intermediate courts have reached competing rulings
with no definitive guidance from the Supreme Court of Texas, we hereby certify the . . . question."); Free v. Abbott
Labs, Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "certification may be advisable where important state
interests are at stake and the state courts have not provided clear guidance on how to proceed") (citing
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992)); Kremen v. Cohen, 325
F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The certification procedure is reserved for state law questions that present
significant issues, including those with important public policy ramifications, and that have not yet been resolved by
the state courts."); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 197 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (certifying a question where
there was "no clearly controlling precedent in the case law of the California appellate courts" and the answer would
"resolve an important question of insurance law . . . that . . . [was] best determined by the California Supreme Court
rather than a federal court").
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principles to decide whether to certify and, at other times, employs the Lehman approach to
certification. For example, the First Circuit has repeatedly stated that "[a]bsent controlling state
court precedent," it "may certify a state law issue to the state's highest court."249 Moreover, the
First Circuit often takes the Lehman approach to certification and considers primarily whether
state law is uncertain in deciding whether to certify. Thus, in Reagan v. Racal Mortgage, Inc.,250
the First Circuit certified where the state statute at issue was ambiguous and the statute's
"interpretive case law"251 did not permit the court to "conclusively determine whether [the
statute] applie[d] to [the] case."252 Recently, the First Circuit even seemed to recognize the
distinction between abstention and certification when it stated in a diversity case that abstention
was inappropriate because exceptional circumstances were not present, but certification was
available to obtain a proper interpretation of the state statute at issue.253 In some instances,
however, the First Circuit takes an abstention-based approach to certification in diversity cases
and asks both whether state law is uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently "important" to
warrant certification.254
2.

The Lehman Approach to Certification

The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to employ primarily the Lehman
approach to certification. Multiple Eleventh Circuit cases demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit,
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E.g., Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing multiple cases for
the same proposition).
250
135 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998).
251
Id. at 45.
252
Id. at 44; see also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1222 (1st Cir.
1995) (certifying a question where state law was unclear and the issue was determinative of the appeal).
253
Sevigny v. Employers Ins., 411 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Pyle v. South Hadley Sch.
Committee, 55 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1995) (federal question case) ("While uncertainty or difficulty regarding state
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more than any other, certifies solely because state law is unclear.255 In contrast to the numerous
diversity cases in the Eleventh Circuit where the court has taken the Lehman approach to
certification, there are very few published diversity-based certification cases in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits. While making conclusions about the circumstances under which these circuits
certify is therefore speculative at best, the available case law suggests that they also take the
Lehman approach to certification.256
Similarly, while the Eighth Circuit also seems to take the Lehman approach to
certification,257 there are too few published cases in the Eighth Circuit from which a definitive
conclusion can be drawn. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit provides an interesting case study
because, like the First Circuit, it has explicitly distinguished certification from abstention in
diversity cases. In deciding whether to certify in Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp.,258 for
example, the Eighth Circuit stated: "[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that certification is not
the drastic procedure that the Court in Meredith . . . held abstention to be."259 The Hatfield court
explained that a certification-based stay in the case at bar, in contrast to the abstention-based
255
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dismissal in Meredith, "would not deprive [it] of jurisdiction, []or . . . force the parties into state
court, but rather would afford the parties a state forum for a state law question which process
may obviate further extensive consideration by this court."260 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit
has said that while Meredith prevents federal courts from declining to exercise their jurisdiction
in diversity cases solely because state law is difficult to determine, certification may solve the
problem of ascertaining unclear state law in such cases.261
Thus, in contrast to all of the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit has not only differentiated
between certification and abstention but has attempted to explain its rationale for doing so:
certification, unlike abstention, does not require a federal court to surrender its jurisdiction or
force the parties into state court for a full round of litigation there. Instead, certification merely
permits a state's highest court to decide a question of law.

V.

WHY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS NEED NOT EMPLOY ABSTENTION
PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT THE CERTIFICATION OF STATE-LAW QUESTIONS IN
DIVERSITY CASES
A.

INTRODUCTION

As Part IV demonstrates, many of the federal circuits essentially have equated
certification with abstention in diversity cases. While they recognize that certification is
procedurally distinct from abstention in that certification does not require remitting the parties to
state court for the start of another lawsuit, they fail to recognize any substantive distinction
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between the two doctrines and offer no explanation for their use of abstention principles to
determine whether they should certify.
Because the circuits do not explain their rationale for equating certification with
abstention in diversity cases, the reasons for this failure are indeterminate. Nevertheless, several
possibilities suggest themselves. First, because certification and abstention are both devices for
resolving unclear issues of state law, it is possible that the circuits simply have inferred that
abstention principles should be used to determine whether certification is warranted. Second,
given the Supreme Court's relative silence regarding certification in diversity cases,262 the
circuits may have taken their cue from the Supreme Court's use and endorsement of certification
in Pullman abstention cases.263 Because the Supreme Court has suggested that certification is
proper in federal question cases where Pullman abstention previously would have been
justified,264 the circuits may assume that certification in diversity cases is proper only where the
Court has approved abstention in diversity cases. Finally, the circuits may reason that federal
courts abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction when they certify in diversity cases.
Accordingly, the circuits may have concluded that certification (like abstention) is warranted
only where exceptional circumstances are present.
Regardless of the reasons for the circuits' application of abstention principles to
certification questions, the question that has not been answered is whether federal courts must
employ abstention principles to limit the certification of state-law questions in diversity cases.
This Part argues that they need not. First, this Part contends that the Supreme Court has never
limited certification in federal question or diversity cases to exceptional circumstances, and
therefore the lower courts are not compelled to do so. Second, this Part maintains that the
262
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decision whether to certify should not turn on the presence of exceptional circumstances because
certification does not result in abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. Instead, when a
federal court certifies a question of law to a state's highest court, it merely postpones the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Thus, there is no reason for federal courts to use the exceptional circumstances
requirement of the abstention doctrines to restrict the use of certification.

B.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT LIMITED CERTIFICATION TO EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN FEDERAL QUESTION OR DIVERSITY CASES
While there is no question that the majority of Supreme Court cases addressing

certification involve Pullman-type constitutional litigation and unclear state law,265 the Court has
never explicitly limited federal question certification to cases in which Pullman abstention
previously would have been appropriate. Indeed, the Arizonans Court unambiguously
distinguished certification from abstention when it chided the Ninth Circuit for blending the two
doctrines.266 Additionally, the Arizonans Court suggested that unsettled questions of state law,
and not exceptional circumstances, are the only condition on certification.267 More importantly,
in Lehman, a diversity case, the Court approved of certification where state law was unsettled but
no exceptional circumstances were present.268 In so doing, the Court implicitly recognized that
certification in diversity cases need not be limited by abstention principles.
Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished certification from abstention in both the
federal question and diversity contexts. Furthermore, in both types of cases the Court has
indicated that the only prerequisite for certification is unclear state law. Consequently, the lower
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federal courts should not regard Supreme Court precedent as permitting certification only in
exceptional circumstances.
C.

CERTIFICATION NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT ABDICATE THEIR
STRICT DUTY TO EXERCISE THEIR JURISDICTION WHEN THEY CERTIFY.
1.

Abstention-Based Stays, Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, and the
Exceptional Circumstances Requirement

The Supreme Court has said that when a federal court remands a removed case to state
court or dismisses a case outright on abstention grounds, the court abdicates its strict duty to
exercise its jurisdiction.269 Thus, the Court has authorized abstention-based remands and
dismissals only in exceptional circumstances where considerations of federal-state comity
require deference to another sovereign.270 The Court also has said that when a federal court stays
its proceedings on abstention grounds in a diversity case, it does not abdicate its strict duty to
exercise its jurisdiction.271 Instead, the federal court merely postpones the exercise of its
jurisdiction until the state courts resolve a question of state law involved in the case.272 Even
though the Court has opined that abstention-based stays do not result in the abdication of duty,
however, the Court nevertheless has sanctioned abstention-based stays, like abstention-based
remands and dismissals, only in exceptional circumstances.273
Because a federal court allegedly does not abdicate its duty when it grants an abstentionbased stay, there is no apparent reason that such stays should be limited to exceptional
circumstances in diversity cases. The Court itself has offered no direct justification for this
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contradiction.274 One possible explanation for the Court's inconsistency, however, is that the
Court implicitly recognizes that an abstention-based stay in a diversity case is the equivalent of
an abstention-based remand or dismissal and effectively results in a federal court's abdication of
its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.275 Therefore, because the consequences of abstention-based
remands, dismissals and stays in diversity cases are the same, the Court has imposed the
exceptional circumstances requirement on abstention-based stays to limit their use to those
circumstances in which it has approved abstention-based remands and dismissals. By doing so,
the Court has ensured that the lower courts are faithful to Meredith and do not abdicate their duty
by granting abstention-based stays simply because state law is difficult to ascertain or unclear.276
The Court's unwillingness to explicitly acknowledge the equivalency of abstention-based
remands, dismissals and stays in the diversity abstention context can be attributed to the historic
inability of courts to decline to exercise their jurisdiction in suits at law.277 Because courts
historically lacked the discretionary power to dismiss damages actions, federal courts today
likewise cannot remand or dismiss suits for damages on abstention grounds.278 If they do, they
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improperly abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction when it is properly invoked.279 In
order to permit abstention in damages actions, therefore, the Court necessarily reasoned in cases
like Thibodaux that a stay does not constitute abdication by a federal court of its duty to decide
the case before it.280 The Court concluded instead that a stay is merely a postponement of the
exercise of jurisdiction.281 By creating the fiction that federal courts sitting in diversity merely
delay the exercise of their jurisdiction when they grant abstention-based stays, the Court was
able to justify extending abstention principles to suits at law. At the same time, however, by
limiting abstention-based stays to exceptional circumstances the Court silently acknowledged
that, for all practical purposes, federal courts surrender their jurisdiction when they grant
abstention-based stays in diversity cases.
While the Court has not openly recognized that abstention-based stays are functionally
equivalent to abstention-based remands and dismissals in its major decisions approving or
rejecting abstention, it has done so in the context of deciding whether an abstention-based stay
order is a "final order" that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.282 Thus, in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,283 the Court held that an abstention-based
stay order was "final" for the purposes of § 1291 because it put the plaintiff "'effectively out of
court'" and therefore "amount[ed] to a dismissal of the suit."284
In Moses H. Cone, a hospital and a construction company entered into a contract which
provided, in pertinent part, that certain disputes "could be submitted by either party to binding

279

See supra Parts II.B. & II.C.
See supra Part II.B.
281
See supra Part II.B.
282
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."
283
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
284
Id. at 2, 10.
280

45

arbitration."285 Eventually, the construction company informed the hospital that it had claims for
"delay and impact costs."286 The hospital then filed a declaratory judgment action in state court
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the company had no right to arbitration under the
contract.287 The company in turn filed suit in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction
"seeking an order compelling arbitration."288 Relying on Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States, the district court stayed the federal action "pending resolution of the
state-court suit because the two suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the
[company's] claims."289 The company then appealed the district court's stay order.290 The Fourth
Circuit heard the case en banc and "held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1291."291 The Court of Appeals then reversed the stay order, remanded the case to the
district court, and instructed the district court to enter an arbitration order.292
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court's stay order was a "final
decision" and therefore was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.293 The Court explained that
because the federal and state suits involved the same issue, the district court's "stay of the federal
suit pending resolution of the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the
federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue would be res judicata."294 The Court
reasoned that because "the sole purpose and effect of the stay [was] precisely to surrender
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jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," it was functionally a dismissal.295 Thus, the district
court's stay order was final and appealable.
The Moses H. Cone Court made clear that its decision did not apply to all stay orders but
was limited "to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the
object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state
forum."296
In the course of its decision, the Moses H. Cone Court also rejected the argument that an
abstention-based stay is distinguishable from an abstention-based dismissal because a stay can be
re-opened by a party upon "a showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights."297
The Court said that regardless of whether a case is dismissed or stayed on abstention grounds,
295
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the federal courts would "remain open" to a party "who later demonstrated the inadequacy of the
state forum."298 Thus, the fact that stayed proceedings can be reopened did not demonstrate "any
genuine difference between a stay and a dismissal."299
The abstention-based stay granted by the district court in Thibodaux is very similar to the
stay in Moses H. Cone, and like the stay in Moses H. Cone, was functionally a dismissal. In
Thibodaux, the plaintiff sued to appropriate property from the defendant under a state eminent
domain statute.300 The defendant removed the suit to federal court under diversity jurisdiction
and sought compensation for the taking.301 The district court stayed the federal proceedings and
remitted the parties to state court to obtain an authoritative answer to the question of whether the
statute permitted the taking at issue.302 In upholding the stay, the Thibodaux Court emphasized
that the district court had merely postponed the exercise of its jurisdiction.303 To shore up this
contention, the Court said that if the state courts found that the taking was permitted, then the
parties would return to federal court for a determination of damages.304 In addition, the Court
noted that if the parties did not file suit in state court in a timely fashion, the district court could
assert its jurisdiction and decide the case itself.305
Like the two suits in Moses H. Cone, the federal and state suits in Thibodaux involved the
same issue: whether the state eminent domain statute at issue permitted the taking. As in Moses
H. Cone, once the state courts resolved the statutory interpretation in Thibodaux, there would be
no further litigation on that issue in the federal court because the state court's judgment on the
issue would be res judicata. If the state courts found that the taking was not permitted, the
298
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federal suit would be over. Even if the state courts found that the taking was permitted and the
parties returned to federal court, however, the only task left for the federal court would be to
award compensation. Thus, the object of the stay in Thibodaux was to require an essential part
of the suit to be litigated in state court. 306 Moreover, like the effect of the Moses H. Cone stay,
the effect of the Thibodaux stay was to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to state court.
While the Thibodaux Court stressed that the stay was simply a postponement of jurisdiction, it
was, like the stay in Moses H. Cone, functionally a dismissal.307 The Thibodaux defendant, as
much as the Moses H. Cone plaintiff, was effectively out of federal court.
Because the stay in Thibodaux was functionally a dismissal, the Court's statement in
Thibodaux that the district court postponed its jurisdiction when it granted the stay (and the
Court's later statements in Quackenbush to the same effect)308 are, at a minimum, suspect. It is
more likely that the Court recognized that the stay in Thibodaux was, for all intents and purposes,
a dismissal, but also understood that an abstention-based remand was not possible in a diversity
suit for damages. To avoid the improper abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction and, at
the same time, allow for deference to another sovereign where necessary, the Thibodaux and
306
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Quackenbush Courts thus approved of abstention-based stays in diversity suits only where
exceptional circumstances are present.
2.

Certification-Based Stays, Postponement of the Exercise of Jurisdiction, and the
Exceptional Circumstances Requirement

In contrast to abstention-based stays, certification-based stays need not be based on
exceptional circumstances because a federal court does not abdicate its duty to exercise its
jurisdiction when it certifies. Certification-based stays, unlike abstention-based stays, actually
result in the postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction rather than the surrender of jurisdiction
to a state court.
When a federal court grants an abstention-based stay, it remits the parties to state court
for a full round of litigation there. The parties begin in a state trial court and must pursue the
litigation as far as possible in state court. Consequently, abstention-based stays "require federal
courts to relinquish all three functions" that they "perform when they adjudicate cases: law
declaration, fact identification, and law application."309 In other words, a federal court abdicates
its duty to exercise its jurisdiction when it grants an abstention-based stay.
On the contrary, when a federal court grants a certification-based stay, it asks the highest
court of a state to answer a question of state law. When the state's high court answers the
question, it returns the case to the federal court. The federal court then lifts the stay and
adjudicates the controversy before it. Certification, therefore, "generally requires federal courts
to cede only one . . . function[]—law declaration. Federal courts remain free to undertake
necessary fact identification both before and after certification, and to apply relevant principles
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of state law to the facts once the highest state court has supplied the necessary rules of
decision."310 Thus, certification "enables the federal court to 'participate[] in the resolution of the
entire case by framing the state law questions [and] specifying relevant facts and legal issues.'"311
In other words, when a federal court certifies it delays the exercise of its jurisdiction, but it does
not abdicate its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.
In Lehman Brothers v. Schein, the only diversity case where the Supreme Court has
addressed certification, the Court itself indicated that certification-based stays need not be
limited to exceptional circumstances because they do not involve the abdication of duty.312 The
Lehman Court remanded a case to the court of appeals for consideration of whether certification
was appropriate given the novelty of the issue and the unsettled state of Florida law.313 The case
involved a run-of-the-mill shareholder's derivative suit and there was no suggestion that
exceptional circumstances were present.314 In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it
had reversed an abstention-based dismissal in Meredith on facts very similar to those in
Lehman.315 The Lehman Court explained that, under Meredith, "the mere difficulty in
ascertaining [state] law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of
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another lawsuit."316 The problem in Meredith, of course, was that the lower court abdicated its
duty to exercise its jurisdiction by sending the parties to state court for a new lawsuit absent
exceptional circumstances.317 The Lehman Court seemed to suggest, however, that ascertaining
state law through certification, despite the absence of exceptional circumstances, is not
problematic because the federal court is merely postponing the exercise of its jurisdiction rather
than abdicating its duty altogether.318
Finally, Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Lehman lends further support to the argument
that certification-based stays constitute a postponement of the jurisdictional duty rather than its
abdication. Rehnquist concurred in Lehman in order "to emphasize the scope of the discretion of
federal judges in deciding whether to use . . . certification procedures.”319 He first explained
that cases like Meredith and Thibodaux "deal[] with the issue of how to reconcile the exercise of
the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon the federal courts with the important
considerations of comity and cooperative federalism which are inherent in a federal system."320
Rehnquist placed certification, however, “[a]t the other end of the spectrum."321 He suggested
that the decision whether to certify, unlike the decision whether to abstain, does not involve
deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist such that the abdication of duty is
warranted.322 Instead, Rehnquist compared the use of certification by a federal court in a
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diversity case to "researching a point of state law" and described it as simply part of the
"decisionmaking process."323
Justice Rehnquist's language in his Lehman concurrence certainly suggests that he did not
view certification-based stays as involving the surrender of jurisdiction to a state court and the
abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. On the contrary, Rehnquist's language indicates
that he viewed the decision whether to certify as one step out of many that a federal court takes
in adjudicating a controversy. This in turn implies that Rehnquist saw certification for what it is:
a postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction that need not be based on exceptional
circumstances.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Over ten years ago a federal judge wrote, "Federal courts evince no clear understanding

of when, how, or even why to certify . . . ."324 This Article has attempted to demonstrate that the
federal circuit courts remained confused about the appropriate use of certification in diversity
cases. More specifically, this Article has argued that several of the federal circuits mistakenly
equate certification with abstention in diversity cases because they incorrectly view certification
as an abdication rather than a postponement of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. These circuits
focus on whether state law is unclear and whether there are exceptional circumstances that
warrant certification.
Instead of focusing on exceptional circumstances, however, the federal courts should
consider turning their full attention to other factors that are highly relevant to the certification
decision. For example, certification, like abstention, results in costs to both the federal and state
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court systems and the litigants in terms of both delay and expense. More importantly, a federal
court's decision not to certify when state law is unsettled raises the Erie325 specter of both forum
shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. While the circuits do sometimes consider
factors such as these in deciding whether to certify, they do so very inconsistently.326 Indeed, it
is impossible to identify the precise circumstances under which a federal court will consider
factors other than the clarity of state law and the presence of exceptional circumstances.
It is a "bedrock fact" that only a state's highest court "can render an authoritative
interpretation of that sovereign's laws."327 Given this fact, federal courts can cause multiple
problems when they unnecessarily decide questions of state law.328 Thus, the federal courts
should stop needlessly limiting certification in diversity cases and at least begin the process of
clarifying when, how and why certification is appropriate.
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